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TransacTional eThics 
and “damage-cenTred” 
research: of banaliTy 
and oblivion 
absTracT
The recent article by Nieuwoudt, Dickie, Coetsee, Engelbrecht and 
Terblanche (2019) entitled “Age- and education-related effects on 
cognitive functioning in Colored South African women” published 
in the journal Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, attracted 
considerable negative attention, leading to its official withdrawal 
from circulation. While it may be argued that this unfortunate piece 
of “scholarship” had “slipped through the cracks”, there is certainly 
a need for a more nuanced analysis of what constitutes ethical 
social research practice. In this article, the issue of intentionality 
and (un)witting Othering is contemplated by invoking Tuck’s notion 
of “damage-centred” research, an approach that continues to 
frame contemporary investigations in the name of social justice. 
It is argued that there is a need to reconsider the practice of 
transactional ethics. Arendt’s concept of the banality (of evil) 
has resonance, as it speaks to the notion of “blissful oblivion of 
complicity”, even in the context of a widespread contemporary 
discourse of social transformation and decolonisation in 
South African higher education. 
Keywords: ethics, banality, damage-centred research, oblivion
1. inTroducTion 
The ethical standards of the academic industrial 
complex are a recent development, and like so 
many post–civil rights reforms, do not always do 
enough to ensure that social science research 
is deeply ethical, meaningful, or useful for the 
individual or community being researched (Tuck & 
Yang, 2014: 233). 
The jury is out as to the extent to which the South African 
academy has engaged in any substantive way with what 
deeply ethical social science research might entail. This may 
be understandable, given the academy’s preoccupation with 
streamlining a national policy framework (and provision), now 
that the country has emerged from a fragmented academic 
and social history. Centuries of racial hierarchisation in 
particular have meant that research and scholarship occur 
in a South African society that is still afflicted by racial 
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of 350 years of political, economic and ideological control by settlers are not likely to have been 
eroded in the short, 25-year post-apartheid phase of the country’s history. 
The notion of a shared or common humanity remains an elusive national project. In fact, 
public circulation of the article by Nieuwoudt, Dickie, Coetsee, Engelbrecht and Terblanche 
(2019) entitled “Age- and education-related effects on cognitive functioning in Colored 
South African women”, published in the journal Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition: 
A Journal on Normal and Dysfunctional Development, might well be considered a lingering 
symptom of the country’s diabolical history (Le Grange, 2019). At a time when there appears 
to be elevated discourse on reconciliation, transformation and decolonisation in the higher 
education space, this kind of scholarship appears still to have a place in the local academy. 
Its occurrence demands analysis and an openness to intellectual conversations about what 
might be deemed socially, morally and ethically acceptable research. 
Clearly the universal principles of research, as outlined in the seminal work of Beauchamp 
and Childress (Beauchamp & Childress, 1979), do not appear to be sufficiently robust for 
the peculiarities that might manifest in post-conflict societies such as South Africa. Social 
divisions and racial hierarchies were the normative (legislated) structure of the country for 
many years. However, researching across race and culture has not been sufficiently theorised 
or debated in any profound way. 
It is not unexpected that this contentious article would generate an acrimonious response 
(Le Grange, 2019). It was in fact a stark reminder that the proverbial “rainbow nation” and 
the national social cohesion project of South Africa’s fledgling democracy is still very much 
in its infancy. Given the apology from the institution’s public relations office on behalf of the 
researchers, one might infer that this was certainly not brazen defiance (on the part of the 
researchers) meant to (re)create racial divisions. How, then, might we analyse and make 
sense of this occurrence, given that institutional ethical review committees are a common 
feature in the South African context, and tasked to apply and oversee adherence to the basic, 
generally accepted principles of research ethics? 
As a point of entry into this analysis, it might be useful to trace back how historical violations 
led to the genesis of contemporary research ethics principles, guidelines that have become 
mandatory in postgraduate research programmes around the world. 
2. The genesis of an eThical code 
The work of Beauchamp and Childress (1979) has framed the ethical code in western research 
institutions, almost acquiring a canonical status. It offers key insights into the principles of 
respect and dignity, justice and beneficence, as well as non-maleficence. However, the 
formalising of ethical principles can be traced back to the judicial tribunal established during 
the Nuremberg Trials after World War II. The revelations at this landmark trial were arguably 
the most publicised exposé of human atrocities relating to biomedical research on prisoners. 
This marked the first public deliberations on ethical principles for research on human subjects. 
The 1964 Helsinki Declaration also signalled the international research community’s 
quest for a universally acceptable code of ethics (Carlson, Boyd & Webb, 2004). Despite this 
international acknowledgement of an ethical code by which researchers ought to abide, ethical 
violations of various kinds persisted in different countries across the world. For example, the 
“Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male” remains a reprehensible piece 
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of America’s racist history, conducted over a 40-year period from 1932 to 1972 (Alsan & 
Wanamaker, 2018). Its exposé forced the then United States (US) government to set up a 
commission to develop a set of guiding principles for research on human participants. The 
subsequent Belmont Report, released in the US in 1979, foregrounded three fundamental 
ethical principles, namely, respect for persons, beneficence and justice (Alsan & Wanamaker, 
2018). However, while these principles came into ‘theoretical’ effect in 1979, it was only in 1997 
that the then US President, Bill Clinton, offered a somewhat belated apology to the victims and 
their families. This was significant, as it marked the first public acknowledgement and official 
assumption of responsibility for the atrocities committed against poor, unsuspecting African-
American men, many of whom perished over the study period. The jury is out as to whether 
the compensation and apology were enough to offset the generational effect on the wives 
and offspring of the victims. It was clear that several ethical violations, among others against 
beneficence, informed consent, respect and justice, with significant maleficence, took place in 
the Tuskegee Study (Shavers, Lynch & Burmeister, 2000). 
Three key issues that emerged then continue to plague the world of research involving 
humans. Firstly, while at face value biomedical ethics principles have appeal in guiding research 
and the work of the institutional ethics committees of the world, it has become apparent that 
despite the relative robustness of the framework, the potential for selective appropriation 
and application that might lead to (un)witting harm, is very real (Pittaway, Bartolomei & 
Hugman, 2010). That the principles are culturally neutral is also a moot point (Westra, Willems, 
& Smit, 2009). In fact, principlism and the principlist model of Beauchamp and Childress in 
particular are somewhat benign in factoring cultural peculiarities into the conduct of research 
(Padela, Malik, Curlin & De Fries, 2015). There is also contention as to the extent to which they 
are able to capture universal moral principles (Christen, Ineichen & Tanner, 2014). 
More than a decade ago suggestions for unique principles that should guide research with 
indigenous communities were mooted (see Castellano, 2004 for example). Similarly, there 
have been appeals for research methodologies that are culturally sensitive and which entail 
reciprocal relations with vulnerable communities (Wilson & Neville, 2009), and a review of 
the applicability and contemporary usefulness of Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles 
(de Castro & Valero, 2018). Clearly, the Beauchamp and Childress framework is not without 
its shortcomings. 
The second key issue emerging from the Tuskegee Study is that the poor and most 
vulnerable continue to be the subjects of experimentation. The 2007 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples makes explicit that historical markers 
of prejudice (race, gender, ethnicity, religion and culture) cannot and should no longer be 
tolerated in the academic research space. Yet research practices such as the study under 
scrutiny happened in plain sight. 
The third issue is that race remains a distinct determining factor as to who might be the 
source of data for studies that involve harm to human beings. Brazen racism and paternalism 
were at play in the Niewoudt et al. study, and it begs the question as to the extent to which 
these issues – which are particularly germane in the South African context – have received 
the attention they deserve. This is an argument that this paper takes up. 
The question, then, is what explains why – despite widespread awareness of ethical 
principles in the academe – research studies such as the study in question came to fruition? 
I want to argue that dispositions of racism and paternalism are cultivated over generations, 
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and while some members of the contemporary generation can and have shaken off unhealthy 
learnt behaviour, an unknown quantity who are oblivious to their racialised socialisation 
remain. Ajam (2019: 1) in her critique of this same study contends that “racial thinking persists 
in the South African academe, despite a growing global scientific consensus that race as a 
biological construct holds no legitimacy” 
The article by Nieuwoudt et al. (2019) was an important trigger piece that has reawakened 
the somewhat complacent level of engagement on ethics as it relates to research in South 
Africa. The purpose of this current article is not an analysis of the specifics of the contents 
of this withdrawn article, and neither is it meant to be an attack on these colleagues per se. 
Rather, the focus is on the key systemic issues at play in the South African research arena that 
are conducive to this kind of research. 
In an attempt to unpack these issues, it might be useful to trace the genealogy of racism and 
paternalism, which may offer an explanation as to why these social injustices have endured.
3. The genesis of racism and PaTernalism
South Africa’s peculiar history, as arguably the last bastion of institutional settler totalitarianism, 
unwittingly makes racism and paternalism susceptible to what might be described as “the 
recency effect”. The relative “freshness” of legislated racism and paternalism has the 
misguided effect of locating the genesis of these social phenomena as uniquely South African, 
and as originating in South Africa. On the contrary, Grosfoguel (2013) asserts that the genesis 
of racism can be traced right back to Columbus’s so-called “discovery” of the Americas in 
the 1400s. Grosfoguel (2013) argues that the conquest of the Americas was not purely an 
economic manoeuvre for trade, but marked the genesis of the construction of racial hierarchies. 
Of note, though, is that religious racism was the precursor to colour racism.  
The following brief description of the social construction of a racial hierarchy runs the risk 
of over-simplification and reductionism (or a linearity) of what was indeed a heinous process 
that occurred over a period of more than 500 years. Race did not exist as a demographic 
classification or social construct in the periods prior to the 1400s. The same can be said for 
the ascription of hierarchical ranking (Grosfoguel, 2007). In fact, European colonialists and 
the European empire struggled to make sense of the indigenous communities that inhabited 
the Americas (and Africa). At the time, what distinguished indigenous peoples outside of 
continental Europe were their peculiar societal systems and spirituality. 
While for obvious reasons they were not Christian, these peoples were constructed as 
entities without religion (Grosfoguel, 2009). Eurocentric Christianity was premised on the 
possession of a soul – of Christians having a soul that rendered them human. People with a 
soul and with a religion were deemed God-like. It follows that people without a “recognisable” 
Christian religion (at the time) were deemed not to have souls. Maldonado-Torres (2007) 
refers to this as misanthropic scepticism, an unfounded uncertainty as to whether others 
(human beings) had souls or not.
Not having a soul and not being God-like relegated such living entities to being classified 
as animal-like. The ascription of a sub-human animality to people who were non-Christians 
legitimated their being utilised as expendable slave labour for the advancement of European 
capitalism and exploitative colonial conquests. All of this was enforceable through a military 
superiority: the possession and use of guns and ammunition. 
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The prototypical, socially fabricated slave was non-Christian, non-European and of 
dermatologically darker pigmentation than the European colonist, and was African, indigenous 
American or Asian. Please note that this grossly abbreviated account is certainly not meant 
to diminish the hundreds of years of systematic, brutal torture and inhumanity meted out to 
generations of subjugated peoples. It does, however, intend to offer an abstraction of how a 
sustained epistemicide (the obliteration of indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing) and 
genocide (the brutal extermination of millions of people at the hands of colonisers) occurred 
and, importantly, to reflect on how narratives of contemporary racial hierarchisation have 
come to maintain its hegemony. 
Grosfoguel (2009) offers a more sophisticated account of what he describes as the “zones 
of being” and “non-being”. He argues that Eurocentric hierarchisation has mutated beyond the 
dermatological white-skinned – that even people of dermatologically darker shades, through 
their assimilation of various degrees of Eurocentricism and economic and social class, have 
self-assigned or self-located in the zone of being (Grosfoguel, 2009). Similarly, Ajam (2019: 1) 
asserts that “ingrained racist mental models are still prevalent across institutions of higher 
learning, and that they are by no means confined to white academics”. 
Note, though, that paternalism and racism are a contingent fabrication of history, and 
masquerade as normal social practice. Paternalism and racism can be described as performative 
(Butler, 1990), or essentially learnt behaviour. It is not a kind of learning (“competence”) that one 
acquires in a single sitting. Learning to be paternalistic and racist comes through immersion, 
observation and repeated practice in social environments that consciously and unconsciously 
teach this. It is likely to occur in settings where racism and paternalism have been normalised 
and reified over generations, to a degree that the practising individual develops a level of 
oblivion. Note that when race is invoked as the conceptual premise in research “politically 
constructed racial categories are reproduced, thereby perpetuating stigma, discrimination, and 
racism” (Hendricks, Kramer & Kopano, 2019: 308). 
4. Theorising oblivion
“[T]he dissonant use of the past” makes the study of oblivion highly relevant in the present 
day (Kaasik-Krogerus, Čeginskas, & Sääskilahti, 2020: 272). Plate (2016) notes however that 
this barren field lacks a coherent theoretical and methodological framework for the study of 
the production of oblivion. Oblivion is a state of unconsciousness: a state of mind in which the 
individual becomes immune to certain stimuli in his/her environment. While the individual is in 
fact very responsive to some pertinent stimuli, they are completely disconnected from others. 
Being oblivious may be akin to being in a meditative state of sorts, akin to where the meditator 
has been trained or has trained him-/herself to shut out irrelevant stimuli automatically and 
systematically in order to maintain a singular focus. Plate reminds us that “oblivion is culturally 
produced” (Plate, 2016: 146). When the meditator repeatedly “practises” marinating in this 
state of unconsciousness, such a state becomes normalised or naturalised, and may acquire 
an element of fixity in the psyche of the practising meditator. The meditator is able to acquire 
and be in this state, without much effort. A state of oblivion then becomes a refined state of 
“unawareness” that can either be produced actively or passively (Plate, 2016). 
Note that different individuals experience a state of oblivion to different kinds of stimuli. 
Usually, being oblivious to certain stimuli in the environment is quite harmless, as the individual 
proceeds with his/her daily life. Note though, that “purposeful oblivion is an active process that 
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serves particular interests and needs” (Kaasik-Krogerus et al., 2020:272). There are, however, 
overt instances where the individuals’ oblivion to their behaviour might well be a nuisance to 
others who inhabit the same space; for example, individuals who converse loudly on their cell 
phones, unaware that they may be intruding on the noise/sound space of others around them. 
Such individuals may check themselves if they become self-aware or if someone alerts them 
to the superfluous noise they are emitting. Similarly, male chauvinism might be regarded as 
shaped by high levels of oblivion to the ridiculousness of self-ascribed superiority based on 
physiology. In the context of social research, what might be the implications of researcher 
oblivion, and how did it play itself out in the now infamous research project and subsequent 
publication of the findings? 
For the purposes of this discussion, I want to focus very specifically on the degrees or levels 
of oblivion that appear to be pervasive, especially as this relates to the research project being 
critiqued. Deleuze and Guatarri’s (1987) concept of assemblage has resonance, as it draws 
our attention to the fact that academic researchers – members of a particular assemblage – 
do not exist in isolation of the fraternity to which they belong. They shape and are shaped by 
the fraternity (Lorraine, 2011). An assemblage, a discursive practice in Foucauldian (Foucault, 
2001) terms, is “signifying and interpreting activities we engage in … they entail enacted 
rule…of the social field” (Lorraine, 2011: 13). The academic researchers in question could well 
argue that they were, in fact, working within the parameters of an established and sanctioned, 
discursive practice or assemblage. The constitution of this particular assemblage is worthy 
of further analysis, as this will demonstrate that the responsibility or the burden of criticism 
should be borne by a wider set of complicit agents. 
5. moving beyond The fall guys 
In tracing back to its genesis, it is clear that the research project under scrutiny passed 
(‘undetected’) through various institutional control systems. In the first instance, the 
conceptualisation of the project by the project team, comprising experienced and relatively 
novice researchers, had deemed the ethicality of the project to be in order. The conceived 
project would have received departmental approval at the host institution (the University 
of Stellenbosch, in this instance). Similarly, the academic leadership gave this project its 
endorsement. The Research and Higher Degrees Committee, comprising academic experts 
in the field, would have approved the research project proposal. It would subsequently have 
come before the University Research Ethics Committee, where research ethics experts would 
have applied the basic principles of research ethics to ascertain the ethical integrity of the 
proposal. This latter committee subsequently consented to the research project. 
In essence, this project did not simply “fall through the cracks” – it was sanctioned in 
accordance with due institutional process. Of significance is that the multiple agents and 
committees that subjected this project to scrutiny failed to raise concerns about its ethicality. 
This makes the case for oblivion particularly compelling, especially since high-level, PhD-
qualified academics/professors appeared unperturbed by the nature of this project. 
The assemblage to which the implicated colleagues belong extends beyond the institution/
university. For instance, the funding agency adjudged this project to be one that was worthy 
of financial backing. Arguments would have been made for its significance and contribution to 
knowledge. Whether there was discussion as to it trampling on the humanity of the research 
participants, is a moot question. Arguably the most disconcerting aspect of this debacle was 
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the endorsement by the journal of this “scholarship”, and the authority given to its “knowledge” 
at that time. It was only after sustained pressure from various sectors of the academy and 
civil society that the article was withdrawn. The managing editor, as first line of defence of the 
scholarship that the journal publishes, proved to be somewhat unwary that the article submitted 
for consideration might prove to be controversial and may have violated an acceptable ethical 
code. A similar analysis applies in relation to the sensitivity of the “blind” reviewers (experts in 
the field) who sanctioned the contents of the article. That these high-level experts were in fact 
blind to the ethical oversights suggests that the expertise might well be of a truncated kind. 
The same argument holds for the members of the editorial board of the journal. 
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the entire assemblage (the various agents in that 
particular fraternity) cannot make claim to having the requisite levels of sensitivity to racial, 
gender and economic class-related issues, as the research project in question and its manifest 
outcome – the article and its ethical frailties – passed through its echelons completely undetected. 
However, the hovering ghosts of modernity and positivism have to share complicity 
(Le Grange, 2019). Modernity and the western intellectual tradition’s hegemony can be traced 
back to Rene Descartes’ cogito ergo sum – “I think therefore I am”. This marked the death of 
spirituality and ushered in an era signalled by a disconnect with nature, the environment and 
human beings. It assumes and advocates for a distant, non-partisan researcher – a clinical 
separation of the researcher and research participant. That the positivist tradition may 
have had an influence on the research “culture” of the researchers in question is certainly 
an argument that should not be discounted. Le Grange reminds us of the phenomenon of 
ethics creep, namely the application of pure science ethics in the human and social sciences 
(Le Grange, 2019). That said, even research in this tradition has largely been able to work 
within the ethical “boundary”. 
The fact that this study and its outcomes was paraded in the public academic space 
suggests a thoughtlessness on the part of this fraternity as to the effects that this kind of 
research may have on the research participants and associated communities. It marks a 
banality with which the research study was executed, a discussion of which follows.
6. abouT banaliTy
Hannah Arendt’s controversial concept, the “banality” (of evil) (Arendt, 1998) received 
widespread critique in the period following the trial of Adolf Eichmann, the notorious Nazi 
commander responsible for executing millions of Jews during World War II. In attempting to 
analyse what predisposed Eichmann to this kind of act, Arendt came to the conclusion that 
people are not innately evil, but that everyone has the propensity to commit evil deeds. In 
describing Eichmann and his actions, Arendt invoked the concept of “banality”, a condition 
where the actor carries out atrocious deeds with an inexplicable thoughtlessness, an acute yet 
authentic inability to think. She described Eichmann as not pathological nor overtly wicked, an 
analysis that drew serious condemnation at the time. 
This analysis might be useful as we extend its tenets to the participating researchers 
in question. The concept of banality, then, might be described as a state of mind in which 
human conscience has receded into an abysmal dormancy or hibernation. People trapped in 
this condition may not be inherently sinister or have an inhuman disposition, but they wilfully 
undertake sinister acts. These acts are not those of stupidity; they do, however, characterise 
a thoughtlessness. Such individuals do not demonstrate “any diabolic or demonic profundity” 
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(Arendt, 1998: 237). Often these acts are carried out in pursuit of personal advancement. 
In this instance, it might well be related to research profile enhancement. In this manner, it 
becomes merely the application of a transactional ethical code, without any level of realisation 
of the repercussions of such behaviour, especially for those on the receiving end. Transactional 
ethics then represents a contract of exploitative exchange in which the researcher secures 
data from unsuspecting participants to whom promises of benefit are made, but seldom 
materialise in any substantive form. It is the outcome of asymmetrical power relations between 
researchers and research subjects in which subjugated research subjects have little or no 
knowledge of the dynamics of their participation in the “exchange” and have limited recourse 
post-consequence. Transactional ethics thus constitutes an inherent venality in plain sight.
There may not have been any overt affiliation to any institutional vision or ideological 
conviction on the part of the perpetrators, but it could be argued that this kind of research 
is premised on a misguided theory of social change – of litigation-motivated change 
(Tuck, 2009). The challenge with this approach to social change is that it essentialises the 
research endeavour to becoming a transaction, a trade of sorts: give us access to the worst of 
your conditions and let us magnify your adverse conditions as leverage for institutional action. 
The assumption here is that of a well-functioning legal/juridical system that is responsive, 
and that the poor have the ability to harness the data effectively to make a legal case for 
interventions to alleviate their plight. However, the reality is that legal systems are notorious 
for lethargy and ineptness in following through to a conclusion in such cases (if they get to 
court at all). The real beneficiaries of the transaction are the researchers, as manifested in the 
research outputs that they produce, from which they gain academic mileage.
The question as to which race groups remain the most “researchable” for this kind of 
social justice research (even in disguised form) is moot. However, it does bring into sharp 
purview who might constitute a convenient, available and accessible research population in 
the South African context. South Africa’s ailing socio-economic situation, and its vast numbers 
of poor and unemployed, present as an appealing and lucrative research field. It is no secret 
as to who the poor and most vulnerable populations are. Data from Statistics South Africa 
(2017) unequivocally indicate that the poverty gap for Blacks was a high 32.5%, while it was 
16.9% for Coloureds, 1.5% for Indians, and under 1% for White South Africans. For Black and 
Coloured South Africans, this affected group comprised children, women and people living in 
rural areas. 
The data are indeed telling, as they reveal quite explicitly the race groups that are 
most susceptible to all kinds of social and medical research. Of concern is when selective 
expedience by researchers overshadows any bona fide social justice intent (Zulu, 2013), a 
research approach that designates and elevates damaged and broken (human beings) as 
evidence for intervention.
7. Troubling damage-cenTred research
Eve Tuck, an indigenous scholar reflecting on research on native American communities in 
Canada and the US, argues that the time for damage-centred research is now long past 
(Tuck, 2009). She contends that damage-centred research has served its purpose, and 
is likely to create more harm to research participants than the benefits that might accrue. 
The argument is premised on the fact that historically social science research has had, as 
a key objective, the need to expose frailties in social settings. The idea was that this kind of 
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exposé through empirical research will draw attention to areas of need/intervention, and that 
resources will be harnessed in the direction of where the deficit occurs. 
At face value, this appears to be a noble intent, and as such should receive support. So, 
in an effort to amplify the plight of oppressed subjects, researchers reveal explicit details of 
the extent of the depravation with “good” intent. In essence, then, the more one can reveal/
demonstrate deprivation, the more likely it is that such social conditions might receive due 
attention. What in fact happens is that this kind of construction inadvertently crosses the 
border into depictions of “damage”, of people as broken, as pathology. Tuck reminds us that, 
[t]hese characterizations frame our communities as sites of disinvestment and 
dispossession; our communities become spaces in which under-resourced health and 
economic infrastructures are endemic. They become spaces saturated in the fantasies of 
outsiders (Tuck, 2009: 412).
While attention is drawn to the condition being reported on, this comes at the expense 
of essentialising the plight of such communities. Even when studies are completed, and the 
findings reported, researchers do little to restore the dignity of the participants that they had 
patronised. The narrative of deficit and depravation lives on. Tuck argues that researchers 
have to reconsider how even the most atrocious contexts/conditions being reported on need 
to factor in, in a highly sensitive way, the humanity of the participants (Tuck, 2009). Failure to 
do so simply renders such research as surreptitious, as it solicits narratives with an exclusive 
focus on dispossession and powerlessness. In other words: “Tell us your tragic stories, we 
will commandeer help”. This is not a new phenomenon or approach to constructing research 
participants. It is, however, timely to revisit what this might mean and how researchers 
(research supervisors included) might envisage this re-alert or re-consciousness as it relates 
to the human beings that they work with in the research field. 
The contention with damage-centred research is that it fails to centre human dignity as an 
important point of departure. In fact, damage-centred research alters and shapes the very way 
in which researchers approach the research field and the manner in which they engage with 
research subjects. Damage-centred research conceives of research subjects in a particular 
way and might degenerate into research that patronises instead of creating conditions 
for empowerment. It might also have the effect of reducing research participants to mere 
repositories of data, as opposed to sources of knowledge, or understanding the research 
participant as moral agent (Pittaway et al., 2010). It also has the effect of reinforcing racial 
stereotypes (Hendricks et al., 2019).
8. abouT symPaThy, PiTy and emPaThy 
Dispositions of pity and mere sympathy are not particularly useful, as they position research 
subjects as victims (to be rescued). The location of power and agency resides in the researcher. 
Victim constructions suggest the need for rescue of sorts – rescue by some outside force. 
The subjects in this instance are maintained in a state of paralysis, which may well endure 
beyond the life of the project, especially when the interventions/rescue/recommendations that 
are lobbied for do not materialise.
The reality is that, very often, recommendations from academic research remain at a 
theoretical (paper) level, contained within theses and journals. They are rarely taken up or 
alter policy in the short term. This kind of research does not guarantee that there will be 
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any change in the material and emotional well-being of the participants. Indeed, it might well 
have the effect of reifying the condition in the psyche of the research subjects, as somewhat 
doomed to remain in a “condemned” state, denying any recognition of the intrinsic ability or 
potential of research participants. 
An empathetic approach, however, frames the research subject in a qualitatively different 
fashion. The premise is to recognise the potential in subjects – to see subjects as able 
and capable. This involves being acutely sensitive to projecting a disposition of respect, 
of deep regard and, importantly, recognising and acknowledging innate agency. Ascribing 
innate agency is the recognition, even in the most despairing of contexts, of the intrinsic 
ability/potential of people. It locates the locus of control and power within subjects. Being an 
empathetic researcher is thus a high-level competence. It requires high levels of perception, 
acute sensitivity to the environment, and the ability to glean information from non-verbal cues 
(body language, tone, mood, emotions projected). It might be described as an approach that 
requires a “listening” with one’s entire body. Empathetic researchers work hard at building 
relationships and trust, in ways that enable research participants to recognise the researcher’s 
authentic intent.
9. concluding commenTs
Several (research) issues emerge from the deliberations presented in this paper. While many 
institutions have stand-alone ethics courses for postgraduate students, or have this aspect 
integrated into research methodology modules, how does the academy invoke the notion 
of researchers “living” ethical principles, as opposed to engaging mere paper ethics and 
bureaucratic compliance? 
Internalising ethical principles as they relate to research cannot be reduced to a mere tick-
box exercise where researchers merely parrot research ethics theory and principles. Given 
the tight timeframes within which researchers have to access the field, collect data and see 
projects to completion, it is not unusual to expect that deep, deliberative conversations about 
the application of an ethical code seldom happen. Pinar’s (2004) insights about complicated 
conversations have salience here. 
The idea of complicated conversations refers to the notion of troubling the self, in the 
first instance, as it relates to the impact of one’s behaviour and actions. It might require an 
introspection of learnt social behaviours and prejudice, especially those that have become 
normalised in our individual psyche, with a view to interrogating the assumptions we make 
about fellow human beings. Implicated in this introspection is a recognition of relations of 
power that exist between researchers and participants, and how this power might produce 
particular behaviours and actions in a Foucauldian sense – an acknowledgement of the 
flawed assumption that researchers often make as to who has power and who does not, and 
power’s productive potential (Foucault, 1979). 
Complicated conversations need to move beyond individuals engaging with themselves; 
there is a need for deliberative conversations in the academic assemblage. How might 
complicit structures – departments, disciplines, higher degrees committees, university 
research committees, journal reviewers, editors, editorial boards – review and reconsider the 
robustness of ethics protocols that prevail? How might the research community contemplate 
candid discussions of how social justice issues of race, gender and class, for example, are 
implicated in the selection of research participants? 
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The multiple agents implicated in the assemblage discussed above might well find this 
paper accusatory. The consequences of not paying attention to having these complicated 
conversations might well be another shameful research project that tramples on the humanity 
of its research subjects in the name of societal transformation. Should this recommendation 
be embraced, there might be much potential for growth and the application of justice as ethical 
principle. It might well spawn paradigmatic innovations as we search for an Arendt-inspired 
reconciliation between modernity and spirituality (Arendt, 1998).
Given that the researchers implicated in the offending study might well be traumatised 
by the fall-out that the research study has created, how might we apply an immanent ethics 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) in a positive spirit of reconciliation, as opposed to attempting to 
ostracise such colleagues? Instead of seeking to punish and alienate/vilify, how might we 
become prospective, as opposed to applying retrospective condemnation? 
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